This paper studies the design of a social long-term care (LTC) insurance when altruism is two-sided. The laissez-faire solution is not efficient, unless there is perfect altruism. Under full information, the first-best can be decentralized by a linear subsidy on informal aid, a linear tax on bequests when the parent is dependent and state specific lump-sum transfers which provide insurance. We also study a second-best scheme comprising a LTC benefit, a payroll tax on children's earnings and an inheritance tax. This scheme redistributes resources across individuals and between the states of nature and the tax on children's labor enhances informal care to compensate for the children's possible less than full altruism.
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The aim is to avoid forcing many pensioners to sell their family homes to fund massive nursing home bills.
There is indeed a close link between bequests and long-term care. In a world without a well-developed LTC insurance market, households are forced to oversave or to selfinsure. Consequently, in case of good health they end up with an excess of saving that can lead to involuntary bequests. It is then clear that if it were possible to tax those bequests, the proceeds could be used to …nance long-term care. Actually if some type of insurance, private or public were available, one would end up with the same result, that is, a perfect smoothing of consumption between the two states of the world, dependency or not. Brunner and Pech (2012) made that argument by showing that a tax on bequests to …nance LTC causes a smaller deadweight loss than an income or consumption tax. This holds true whether or not the parents are altruistic. The problem is that in a world with heterogeneous agents it might be impossible to distinguish bequests that are made by dependent parents from those made by autonomous parents.
The matter gets more complicated when we look at the case of formal LTC …nanced by saving or insurance and informal services coming from children. For the time being we assume that formal and informal care are complements. Dependent parents will have to exchange those informal services against the prospect of some bequests. If children are not altruistic, we will have a pure quid pro quo exchange; if they are altruistic they might help their parents even if these cannot bequeath anything. The amount of help will depend on the extent of …lial altruism. In case of perfect altruism, children will provide the optimal amount of assistance to their parents.
In a world of identical individuals, the social insurance scheme will serve two purposes: it redistributes resources across the two states of nature and it induces the child to help his parent. If individuals di¤er in the level of their wage, social insurance must also redistribute resources across individuals.
To study these issues we consider a population consisting of one parent and one child families. Parents are pure altruists towards their child, while the child's altruism may be imperfect. Parents are retired and have accumulated some wealth. They face a probability of becoming dependent and needing LTC. The need of LTC requires expenditures of some monetary amount. In case of dependency parents would like to bene…t from the aid of their children, who are ready to help their parent out of altruism but also with the expectation of some inheritance. 3 We characterize the …rst-best allocation and show that the laissez-faire is not ef…cient, unless there is perfect altruism. Under full information the …rst-best can be decentralized by a linear subsidy on informal aid, a linear tax on bequests when the parent is dependent, and state speci…c lump-sum transfers which provide insurance.
Next, we study the second-best allocation when the instruments available are linear (state independent) taxes on bequests and children's labor income which …nance a transfer to the dependent elderly. 4 Observe that the tax on children's labor income is in our setting e¤ectively equivalent to a subsidy on informal care. 5 We …rst consider a setting with ex ante identical individuals. We show that both taxes should be positive. The tax on labor which subsidizes informal care compensates for possible imperfect altruism; this is like in the …rst-best implementation. Both taxes also provide insurance, and that is relevant as the …rst-best state speci…c lump-sum transfers or taxes that provide full insurance are not available. Labor and bequest taxes are then used to provide (partial) insurance.
Finally, we consider a setting with ex ante heterogenous families, which di¤er in children's' productivities and parents' wealth. We show that the results obtained in the homogenous family case carry over. However, the two tax rates now also include a positive redistributive term. Throughout this paper private LTC insurance is assumed away. This is for the sake of simplicity but also because in most countries the LTC insurance market is extremely thin; see Finkelstein (2007, 2009 ).
Identical individuals 2.1 The model setup
Consider a population of a size normalized to one, consisting of one parent (subscript 'p') and one child (subscript 'c') families. Parents are pure altruists towards their child, while a child's altruism may be imperfect. Parents are retired and have accumulated wealth y. They face the probability of becoming dependent and needing long-term care. The need of LTC requires expenditures of amount L. In case of dependency the parent would like to bene…t from the aid of his child, who is ready to help his parent out of altruism but also when receiving some inheritance b. Parents choose the bequest to their children. In case of autonomy, the child inelastically supplies one unit of labor at a wage rate w. In case the parent needs long-term care, the child's time spend on the labor market is reduced by the time spend for informal care provision a and gross earnings amount to w(1 a). Care provided by the child reduces the monetary loss from LTC by h(a) L (with h 0 > 0; h 00 < 0) since then the parent requires less professional care services.
In sum, the parent's and child's expected utilities are given by
where 2 [0; 1] re ‡ects the child's degree of altruism and a b indicates the state of staying healthy. The utility function u is the standard one whereas, H denotes the utility for long-term care. These functions satisfy u 0 ; H 0 > 0 and u 00 ; H 00 < 0. Furthermore, we assume H(x) < u(x) for any x, due to the loss of autonomy.
The timing of the model is as follows: the government moves …rst and announces its policy (stage 0). Then, the parent and the child play the following two-stage game.
In stage 1, the parent chooses (for each state of nature) a level of bequest. In stage 2, after the state of nature is revealed, children decide how much informal care to provide if their parent is dependent. Otherwise, children simply consume their income plus the bequest.
To determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve this game by backward induction. We …rst study the …rst-best allocation which provides a benchmark against which we can compare the laissez-faire allocation, obtained by dropping stage 0.
First-best solution
With ex ante identical families, we can de…ne the optimal allocation as the one maximizing the expected utility of a representative dynasty. Assuming that both parents and children receive equal social weights, the …rst-best problem can be written as
where the decision variables are informal care provision a and parent's and child's consumption in both states of nature. We denote the latter by m, b m, c and b c respectively.
In the …rst-best all variables are directly set, assuming full information and disregarding the multi-stage structure of the game. The speci…cation of the game will of course be relevant below, when we study the decentralization of the …rst-best optimum. Let denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint (3). The …rst order conditions (FOCs) characterizing the optimal solution can be written as follows
Equation (4) states the equality of marginal utilities of incomes across generations and states of nature (full insurance), while equation (5) describes the e¢ cient choice of informal care. It states that the opportunity cost of informal care w equals its marginal bene…t.
Laissez-faire allocation 2.3.1 Stage 2: Choice of children
In case of autonomy, children do not have to make any decision. They consume their income and bequest, enjoying a utility u(w + b b). When their parents are in need of LTC, they solve the following problem
The …rst-order condition of the above problem is given by
This equation de…nes the optimal level of a as a function of b: a = a(b). We have
as the second-order condition (SOC) is negative
In words, if parents increase their bequest, the willingness to provide informal care by the child also increases.
Stage 1: Choice of parents
The problem of the parents is to choose (in both states of nature) the level of bequests to their children. In case of dependency parents have more needs but at the same time they might leave a higher bequest to induce more assistance from their children. Their problem is the following
Taking into consideration equation (6) the FOCs with respect to b and b b can be written
It can be easily veri…ed that for = 1 the parent leaves the e¢ cient amount of bequests so that H 0 (m) = u 0 (c). This in turn goes hand in hand with an e¢ cient amount of aid provided by the child h 0 (a) = w; see equation (5) . This result is not surprising as for perfect altruism, on both the parent's and the child's side, the optimization problem of the two family members coincides with the one of the social planner. Whenever < 1 this is no longer the case as the child puts a too low value on the parent's bene…ts of informal care. In this case the parent leaves a large than otherwise e¢ cient bequest to induce the child to provide more care. We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1
The laissez-faire solution of the two-stage game of altruistic parents and (partly) altruistic children has the following properties:
(i) when H 0 (m) > u 0 (m) parents and children are less than fully insured against the risk of LTC.
(ii) when children are perfectly altruistic, i.e. = 1, informal care and bequests are e¢ ciently chosen.
(iii) when children are partly altruistic, i.e. < 1, then (a) informal care is ine¢ ciently low since children do not take into consideration the full bene…t of their care to their parents, and (b) bequests are ine¢ ciently high since parents move …rst and want to induce their child to provide more care.
Decentralization of the …rst-best allocation
Assume for the time being that there is no asymmetry of information so that all relevant variables including informal aid are publicly observable. In the following we show that the FB allocation within our multi-stage setting can be decentralized by a lump-sum transfer (social LTC insurance) from the healthy to the dependent elderly ( b D; D) supplemented by a tax on labor income a and on bequests b for those children whose parents are dependent. Public transfers must be chosen such that the government's budget constraint
is balanced.
Family' s problem reconsidered
Again, in case of autonomy children do not have to make any decision; they consume their income and bequest enjoying a utility u(w + b b). When their parents are in need of long-term care, they now solve the following problem
The …rst order condition of the above problem is given by 
Care increases with bequests while a tax on bequest dampens it. An income tax either pushes or dampens informal care provision and public LTC decreases informal care.
Comparison of equation (12) with the …rst-best allocation (equations (4) and (5)) shows that to implement the …rst-best level of care we …rst need a tax on child's income,
i.e. a = 1 . A tax on income implicitly subsidizes the child's informal care provision so that the trade-o¤ between the child's marginal costs and marginal bene…t of care is the e¢ cient one.
The problem for the parents is now the following
Using equation (12), the FOCs with respect to b, and b b are
Equations (18) D) are chosen such that the parent (and thus also the child) is fully insured 6 The second order condition is SOC a = ((1
. The tax on bequests must then be chosen such that its e¤ect on informal care is o¤set, i.e.
That is, we have to tax bequests when the parent ends up being dependent. This tax o¤sets the parent's incentives to induce informal care above its …rst-best level. 7 We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 To decentralize the …rst-best optimum we need three types of tools (i) a distortionary tax a that fosters child's assistance in case of impure altruism,
(ii) a tax b on bequests when the parent is dependent, and Note that we have assumed away private insurance. If private insurance were available, its role would depend on the existence and the size of loading costs. With zero loading costs, a …rst best could be achieved simply by taxing child's labor at the appropriate rate, namely 1 , and by taxing bequests when the parent is dependent.
With positive loading cost, we also need the lump-sum transfers, which then completely crowd out private insurance.
3 Second-best solution
Identical children
We now turn to the second-best. We assume that the government can use only linear (proportional) taxes on bequests and on labor earnings t, to …nance a LTC bene…t g.
Tax rates cannot be conditioned on the parents'health status. We use the notation t, and g rather then a , b and D to avoid confusion with the …rst-best implementation. 7 The expression for @a =@b is not independent of b .
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With our instruments we write the revenue constraint as
The child' s problem
The child solves
which apart from the change in notation is equivalent, to (11) so that the FOC continues to be given by (12) and can be written as
The solution is given by a = a(b; t; ; g). The comparative statics properties of this function follow those described by equations (13)- (16). Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, we thus have a b > 0; a < 0; a t ? 0; a g < 0.
Parent' s problem
Turning to the parent's problem, it is given by
The two FOCs wrt. b b and b are
Using (21), equation (24) can be rewritten as
These conditions de…ne the bequests supply functions, i.e. b = b(t; ; g) and b b = b(t; ).
We implicitly assume positive bequests in either state of nature. Substituting for b into a yields the level of aid as a function of the government's instruments a = a (b(t; ; g); t; ; g) ã(t; ; g):
The government' s problem
The second-best problem can now be expressed by the following Lagrangean
Using the envelope theorem, we can write the FOCs wrt. g, t and as
These FOCs can be rearranged using the compensated form with
In other words, we keep the tax rates t and as sole decision variables, while accounting of course for their impact on g, via the government's budget constraint. This yields 8
To interpret these formulas, we make the standard assumption that the cross-derivatives are negligible. This amounts to posit that the cross e¤ects of taxation do not dominate the direct e¤ects. Formally, b c t = b b c t =ã c = 0. We show in Appendix A.1 that we then have
where u 0 (c) H 0 (m) ? 0 and b u 0 (b c) H 0 (m) < 0. 9 The denominators in these two formulas are standard. They re ‡ect the (adverse) e¢ ciency e¤ect of taxes.
Remember that > 0 re ‡ects the welfare gain when the budget constraint is marginally relaxed. Normally, one expectsã c t > 0 and
To interpret the numerator of equation (28) 
, where x = ; t. 9 This means that b m > b c > c.
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Turning to the numerator of equation (29), note that the …rst term in this numerator vanishes if = 1. Otherwise, it represents the need to foster child's assistance. This term mirrors the …rst-best implementation but has a di¤erent structure in the secondbest. The second and third terms are the same as in the previous condition. They re ‡ect the insurance bene…ts provided by the tax. They give the welfare gap between the young and the dependent elderly in the two states of nature. The larger the marginal utility of the dependent is relative to that of the young, the larger are the bene…ts of the LTC bene…ts. Consequently, there is a need for a higher tax to …nance the social bene…t g.
Private insurance would not change our qualitative results. Even with zero loading cost, the …rst-best cannot be achieved with the instruments considered here; it would require a state-contingent inheritance tax. With a positive loading cost individuals buy less than full insurance and the two taxes continue to make up for part of the incompleteness of private insurance protection.
Heterogenous families
So far families were assumed to be identical. Thus the role of social policy was limited to insuring families against dependency shocks. In other words the role of social LTC bene…ts was solely to enhance e¢ ciency (including that of insurance coverage). We now assume that families di¤er ex ante in the children's productivity levels and in the parents'resources. This introduces a redistributive concern into our problem. We assume that both (w i and y i ) are positively correlated so that our assumption of positive bequests is valid across families. Again, the government levies a ‡at tax t on earnings and on bequests to …nance a uniform LTC bene…t g. Within such a framework the social insurance scheme pursues an additional objective, namely redistribution.
14 The government's revenue constraint has to be modi…ed such that
where n i is the relative number of families with productivity w i and y i . The optimizing behavior of children and parents remains the same as described above; each child and parent of type-i solves the problem given in (20) and (22). From this we obtain optimal long-term care provision a i =ã(t; ; g) withã i < 0;ã it ? 0 andã ig < 0 and optimal
Government' s problem
The second-best problem of a utilitarian government with heterogenous families can be expressed by the following Lagrangean expression
Maximizing this expression with respect to g, t and yields the following FOCs
where we use the operator E for P i n i . As for identical families we can rearrange the above FOCs in terms of compensations with dg=d and dg=dt; see Appendix (A.2) . By assuming that the cross derivatives are nil, i.e. b c it = b b c it =ã c i = 0, we have
and
The interpretation of these two formulas is the same as in the case of identical individuals with one exception, namely the covariance terms that are expected to be negative. This is because with higher income/wealth the di¤erence in marginal utilities between states of nature decreases. In other words, earnings inequality pushes for more taxation of either earnings or bequests. The covariance terms thus measure the redistributive bene…ts of social LTC which come on top of the e¢ ciency bene…ts described in the earlier sections.
The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that informal aid a is not observable and that policy instruments are restricted to public LTC provision to dependent parents, g, …nanced by a linear tax on the children's labor income at rate t and a linear tax on bequests at rate . Assume further that the cross compensated e¤ ects of on a and of t on b andb are negligible. Then we have: (i) With ex ante homogenous families the tax on inheritance depends on two terms:
an insurance term and an e¢ ciency term that is the compensated derivative of bequests with respect to the tax. The earnings tax depends on a third term re ‡ecting the need to foster aid of partially altruistic children.
(ii) With heterogenous families the two taxes depend also on an additional equity (redistributive) term that increases their social desirability.
Conclusion
The starting point of this paper is the concomitance of two trends: the increasing needs for LTC, and unusual growth of inheritance. In a laissez faire economy with neither public nor private insurance, dependency would bite a big chunk of accumulated wealth with the consequence that bequests would greatly di¤er for kids with dependent parents and kids with healthy parents. Children's care can only partially mitigate those di¤erences. Given that the market for LTC insurance is typically thin or even absent, one has to rely on public action to restore some balance between the two states of nature.
In a …rst-best world, a subsidy on children's care, state-dependent bequest taxes and a state-contingent lump sum tax could achieve the optimum and provide full insurance.
If for obvious reasons individualized lump sum taxes are not available, one has to rely on second-best schemes. In this paper a wage tax and a linear inheritance tax contribute to …nance a uniform LTC bene…t.
The main conclusion is that under plausible conditions linear taxes on both inheritances and wages to …nance a public LTC ‡at rate bene…t are desirable. The tax on children's labor income e¤ectively subsidizes informal care, like in the …rst-best implementation. It is required when altruism is less than full. Both taxes also provide insurance and, in the case of heterogenous families (di¤ering in children's productivity and parent's wealth) redistributive bene…ts. We have seen that we can end up with a subsidy of bequests or even earnings in the special case where the welfare of the dependent would be quite high relative to that of his children and the probability of dependency would be particularly high.
Throughout this paper we have assumed that parents in both states of nature were leaving some bequests. This implies that parents are relatively wealthier than their children, and that dependency does not represent a large …nancial loss. In an extension of this work we would like to explore cases where some parents do not leave any bequest or they only bequeath in the healthy state. It is expected that if bequests in the healthy state were much higher than those in the state of dependency and if the wealthy families were leaving high bequests whereas the poorer families were bequest-constrained, estate taxation would play an even more important role. Additionally, we would like to introduce private insurance with loading costs and study the possibility of non-linear LTC policies. Another possible extension is to look at a society where only a share of elderly dependent individuals have children and thus the possibility to rely on informal care
provision. In such a framework the government is confronted with a tagging problem (see, Kanbur and Tuomala this issue). We now rewrite equations (26) and (27) as ( 
A Appendix
We use u 0 (c) H 0 (m) ? 0 and b u 0 (b c) H 0 (m) < 0; to represent the gap between the child's marginal utility of consumption and that of the dependent parent.
We now rewrite the FOC's as 
Solving for t and yields the expressions in the text.
